Non-naturalism Gone Quasi:
Explaining the Necessary Connections between the Natural and the Normative

Teemu Toppinen[*]

A few facts: Capitalism is a source of unending degradation; saving seats in busy coffee shops before ordering is scummy[1]; we ought to view the level of our greenhouse gas emissions with abhorrence; had I promised to smuggle six references to Finnish death metal into this paper, there'd be some reason for me to do so; the recent Rotten Sound album is pretty awesome[2]; so is football; and Helsinki isn't bad in the summer. Facts such as these – *normative* facts – seem quite unlike *natural* facts. Natural properties (e.g., being filled with water, being a parent, redness) and facts (e.g., the fact that I'm a parent) are, roughly, properties and facts such that could figure in empirical regularities and that we can find out about by scientific or empirical means (cf. Smith 2000). Normative properties and facts seem very different. They seem to be something 'over and above' the natural ones. I won't say much about what this amounts to. Being filled with water plausibly isn't anything over and above, but rather seems *identical* to, being filled with H_2O. My being a parent isn't anything over and above, but rather *fully consists in*, my having a son. And being colored might be nothing over and above being red, for being red is *a way of being* colored. However, that a certain type of action is wrong (say) doesn't seem to be just a matter of how things are naturalistically speaking. Some natural features may *make* an action wrong, alright, but if so, the wrongness of the action nevertheless seems to be something over and above those natural features (see Enoch 2011, ch. 5.1; Parfit 2011, pp. 299–301). If that's all correct – and I don't expect to have made any new converts here – we should accept the following view, which I'll call non-naturalism:[3]

---

[1] I owe this way of putting it to Kathryn Lindeman.

[2] That's four or five, already (at least if deathgrind counts).

[3] The following formulation derives from one given in Leary MS, but I've made some changes, for better or worse.

NON-NAT   Normative properties and facts exist; they are *sui generis*, that is: different in kind from, and something over and above, natural and any other kind of properties and facts.

Non-naturalism is a fairly popular view (e.g., Enoch 2011, Parfit 2011, Scanlon 2014). Interestingly, and importantly, this view may be combined either with *cognitivism* or with *non-cognitivism* (cf. Dreier 2004, 2015):

COG   For any normative proposition, p, of the form 'x is N' (where 'N' stands for a normative property), (1) to think that p is to represent x as having the property of being N, and (2) this – the truth of (1) – doesn't hold just in virtue of the fact that to think that p is to be in a certain kind of broadly desire-like state.

NON-COG   For any normative proposition, p, of the form 'x is N', (i) to think that p is to be in a certain broadly desire-like state of mind, and (ii) if it is also to represent x as having the property of being N, this is so just in virtue of the truth of (i).

The issue between cognitivism and non-cognitivism concerns, then, what it is in virtue of which some state of mind counts as having a normative belief, or a belief with a normative content. I take it that this comes at least pretty close to understanding the distinction between these views as a distinction in *metasemantics* – that is, as a distinction between different accounts of what it is in virtue of which certain meaningful items have the meanings that they have (see, e.g., Ridge 2014, Chrisman 2016). Combining non-naturalism with cognitivism gives us *realist non-naturalism*; the combination of non-naturalism and non-cognitivism results in *quasi-realist non-naturalism*. Realist non-naturalism has been widely considered to have a hard time explaining the metaphysically necessary relations between the natural and the normative. In particular, many have worried that realist non-naturalism lacks the resources to explain the metaphysical necessities that figure in SUPER (see, e.g., McPherson 2012, Leary MS, Rosen MS):

SUPER   Whenever something has a normative property, it also has some natural property such that it is metaphysically necessary that anything that has this natural property also has the normative property.

But of course there are, very plausibly, also other metaphysically necessary connections between natural and normative properties, which are likely to raise similar issues. We might consider, for instance:

OIC   It is metaphysically necessary that if someone ought to perform a certain action, she is able to do so.

I argue that while realist non-naturalists do indeed seem to be in trouble with regard to explaining the metaphysically necessary links between the natural and the normative, accepting non-cognitivism makes all the difference. In section 1, I very briefly explain how SUPER raises a challenge for non-naturalism, and how – as has been recently pointed out by Jamie Dreier (2015) – it's not at all obvious that quasi-realist non-naturalism offers a way of escaping the challenge. In section 2, I briefly explore different kinds of accounts of what it is to have thoughts concerning metaphysical necessity. I then proceed to argue, in section 3, that it matters how we understand metaphysical necessity thought. In particular, I suggest that once we approach the explanatory challenge regarding SUPER in the light of an understanding of metaphysical necessity thought that makes sense given a quasi-realist take on normative judgment, this challenge takes the shape of a first-order normative issue, and will then be answerable by the quasi-realists' lights. Section 4 offers some remarks on OIC, suggesting that this thesis raises an interesting explanatory challenge for (some) non-naturalists, but that this challenge, too, can be answered given acceptance of a suitable form of non-cognitivim plus a fitting take on thought concerning metaphysical necessity. When it comes to explaining the necessary connections between the normative and the natural, all will be fine, it seems, if non-naturalists just go a little quasi. (Section 5 basically just repeats that last sentence.)

1 – NON-NATURALISM AND THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE

With many others – and following Dreier (1992, MS), in particular – I take the normative to strongly supervene on the natural:

SUPER* $\Box_C(\forall F \text{ in } a)(\forall x)[Fx \rightarrow (\exists G \text{ in } \beta)(Gx \ \& \ \Box_M(\forall y)(Gy \rightarrow Fy))]$

This requires some explanation: a is the family of normative properties, β is the family of natural properties; $\Box_C$ stands for conceptual necessity, $\Box_M$ for metaphysical necessity. And so what the thesis says is that it is conceptually necessary that the following is true:

SUPER   Whenever something has a normative property, it also has some natural property such that it is metaphysically necessary that anything that has this natural property also has the normative property.

3

This thesis is becoming increasingly controversial, these days (see Sturgeon 2009, Hattiangadi MS, Miller MS, Rosen MS), but I shall suppose that it's true.[4]

What, then, is the challenge that this supervenience thesis raises for non-naturalists? Very briefly, the problem is as follows. Let us set the claim that SUPER is a *conceptual* truth to one side, and focus on asking: why is it that certain natural features metaphysically necessitate certain normative features? It isn't plausible that such necessities are simply brute, or unexplainable. They seem to be in need of explanation. On some views, the relevant necessities are easily explained. If normative properties were natural properties, then the necessitation of the normative by the natural would be easily accounted for. However, according to the non-naturalist, normative properties are *sui generis* and radically discontinuous from the natural properties. The question then is: why are there necessary connections between these wholly discontinuous properties? Non-naturalism doesn't seem to allow for any explanation for this, but rather seems to treat these necessary connections as brute. If that is correct, then this is plausibly a big minus for the view. That is, if non-naturalism doesn't have the resources to offer an explanation for the necessary connections between the natural and the normative, this may not constitute a refutation of the view, but it seems to give us some considerable reason to reject it. (This brief characterization of the problem owes a lot especially to Tristram McPherson's (2012) treatment of the issue.[5])

Perhaps this is not quite the right way to push the challenge. Perhaps non-naturalists can explain the relevant necessities by appealing to the idea that certain natural properties just have the property of *making* things good, right, etc. (Olson 2014; cf. Enoch 2011, Scanlon 2014). Let's suppose that a straightforward version of maximizing hedonistic utilitarianism is true. Why is it necessary that if an action fails to maximize happiness, it is morally wrong? Well, this is necessary because if an action has the property of failing to be happiness-maximizing, this makes it the case that the action has the further property of being morally wrong. This response sounds quite sensible. Yet it also sounds very unhelpful. The challenge was to explain why having certain natural properties necessitates having certain normative properties, where the normative properties are something over and above the natural ones. It is perhaps fine to say that the necessitation relations in question are explained by the fact that if something – for example, an action – has certain natural properties, this makes it wrong (or right, or whatever). But now the question is: how should we understand the making-relation here, given that the normative is something over and above the natural. We might say that if some substance is H_2O, this makes it water.

---

[4] For some responses to concerns raised in Sturgeon 2009 and Rosen MS, see, e.g., Ridge 2007, McPherson 2012, Dreier MS, and Miller MS.

[5] The problem, or something in its neighborhood, has been advanced by a number of philosophers. In addition to McPherson 2012, see, e.g., Blackburn 1971, 1984, 1985; Dreier 1992, MS; Horgan 1993; and Väyrynen forthcoming. Non-naturalists have of course offered different responses to this problem. See, e.g., Shafer-Landau 2003, Stratton-Lake & Hooker 2006, Enoch 2011, Scanlon 2014, Leary MS, and Rosen MS (although Shafer-Landau may not qualify as a non-naturalist by my lights, as on his view, the natural exhaustively realizes the normative, just like, according to a non-reductive physicalist in philosophy of mind, certain physical states exhaustively realize the mental ones). For criticisms of these responses, see, e.g., Dreier 2015, MS; Leary MS, and Toppinen MS a).

Or that if I have a son, this makes me a father. Or that if a chair is red, this makes the chair in question colored. However, we get to say these things because certain intimate metaphysical relations hold between the relevant properties – because having one of the properties (being water, being a parent, being colored) is nothing over and above having the other (being H_2O, having a son, being red). If normative properties are *sui generis*, wholly discontinuous from the natural ones, then how is it that, for example, an action's having a natural property can make it have a normative property, and thereby necessitate its being wrong? It seems that critics of non-naturalism may insist that even if non-naturalists do have an explanation to give – they can appeal to the making-relation – the explanation that they have to offer is a bad, metaphysically queer one.[6]

It is often supposed that non-cognitivists easily escape the kind of challenge that I have outlined above. The thought is that for a non-cognitivist, SUPER does not even make any sense (as there are not any normative properties, really), or should, in any case, be understood as articulating a certain kind of restriction on our normative concepts (e.g., Klagge 1988). The restriction would be that we treat possible scenarios, events, or whatever, that are exactly alike in all natural respects, the exact same way in our normative thinking. Moreover, it is sometimes suggested, non-cognitivists are well-positioned to give an explanation for why this kind of restriction for use of normative concepts is in place. That is, non-cognitivism may have promising resources for explaining why it is that the normative supervenes on the natural as a matter of conceptual fact. Here is Blackburn's (1971, p. 122) early articulation of the basic idea (see also, e.g., Hare 1952, ch. 10, Blackburn 1984, pp. 185–186, Smith 1994, pp. 24–25, Gibbard 2003, ch. 5):

> There can be no question that we often choose, admire, commend, or desire, objects because of their naturalistic properties. Now it is not possible to hold an attitude to a thing because of its possessing certain properties and, at the same time, not hold that attitude to another thing that is believed to have the same properties. The nonexistence of the attitude in the second case shows that it is not because of the shared properties that I hold it in the first case. Now, moral attitudes are to be held towards things because of their naturalistic properties. Therefore it is not possible to hold a moral a moral attitude to one thing, believe a second to be exactly alike, yet at the same time not hold the same attitude to the second thing. Anybody who appears to do this is convicted of misidentifying a caprice as a moral opinion.

---

[6] Jonas Olson (2014, 2016) suggests that non-naturalists can provide a satisfying response to the supervenience challenge by appealing to the making-relation, and that if one insists on this being a metaphysically mysterious move, the worry concerning non-naturalism collapses to a worry about the sheer intuitive queerness of normative properties. But this doesn't seem right, as the worry may still concern primarily the queerness of the explanation of necessary relations between the natural and the normative properties. Normative properties end up seeming queer only *because* there's no good explanation for the relevant necessitation relations (see Toppinen 2016).

This might need some tweaking. For instance, we should probably allow for the possibility of violating the supervenience constraint. So, perhaps it is possible to have an attitude of the relevant kind toward one thing on the basis of its having certain naturalistic properties, to believe that another thing has the same naturalistic properties, and yet to fail to have the relevant attitude toward the latter thing. It is just that this is incoherent. Having this combination of attitudes fails to make sense. But this seems, indeed, quite plausible. Suppose that, having heard a recording of a song by the band Convulse from 1992, I judge the song in question to be awesome, thanks to its instantiating musical murkiness and brutality in certain most appealing ways. Now, suppose that, miraculously, I then instantly come across another recording of another death metal piece from 1992, which is sonically indistinguishable from the first one.[7] And suppose, moreover, that I have no other (possibly relevant) knowledge about the properties of the pieces of music in question. If I now deem this latter piece to be completely non-awesome, I perhaps hold a possible combination of attitudes, but this combination of attitudes fails to make any sense. As an evaluator, I am bound to find things awesome on the basis of their natural properties, and so, if I form judgments about the awesomeness of the two pieces of music on the basis of the evidence that is available to me, I am committed to deeming them equally awesome. This is compatible with the idea that, had the recordings been sonically distinguishable, it might have made sense for me to judge them differently despite being unable to articulate any reason for why this is so ("Yeah, this, too, is murky and brutal – makes your ears bleed, huh – but, I don't know, there's something missing here"). And of course, given additional knowledge, I might be sensitive to various other features of the recordings. For instance, a miraculously sonically indistinguishable recording, which I know to be from a retro band in 2016, might not sound so exciting to me.

Now, it is controversial whether any non-cognitivist explanation of broadly this sort, for the status of SUPER as a conceptual truth, is successful (see Zangwill 1995, p. 246, Shafer-Landau 2003, pp. 88–89, Sturgeon 2009, pp. 82–87). But suppose that some such explanation can be made to work. Still, as has been recently observed by Dreier (2015), this would not mean that the quasi-realist non-naturalist would have any edge over the realist non-naturalist when it comes to explaining the metaphysical necessities that SUPER commits us to. Or it is not, in any case, instantly clear why the quasi-realist would be in any happier position. This is so because we need to distinguish between two different explanatory challenges. One is to explain why SUPER is a conceptual truth. The other one is to explain why certain necessary connections between the natural and the normative – those that SUPER commits us to – obtain. Above, I have outlined a quasi-realist answer to the former question. But, as is nicely explained by Dreier (2015, pp. 289–290), this answer does not seem to help us, at all, with regard to answering the latter question. SUPER tells us that the normative features of things are metaphysically necessitated by their natural features. Let us suppose that one of the relevant metaphysical necessities is this: that happiness-

---

[7] I suspect, though, that some people who aren't connoisseurs of death metal may fail to find this scenario so very miraculous.

maximizing actions are morally right. Non-naturalists – both realist and quasi-realist – may accept that this is so. They will both be happy to admit that some actions really have the property of being morally right, thanks to their being happiness-maximizing, or hedonically optimal, as one might put it. The puzzling question, then, is, again, why is it metaphysically necessary that whatever is hedonically optimal is right? Why the necessary connection between these (by the non-naturalists' lights) completely distinct, very different, properties? As noted above, the realist non-naturalist doesn't seem to have a good response to this question. But nothing in the quasi-realist's explanation for why SUPER is a conceptual truth seems to directly suggest an answer either. And so it might very well seem that the quasi-realist is in the exact same boat with the realist. At least it remains to be seen why this would not be so.[8]

2 – MODAL REALISM AND QUASI-REALISM

There may be a good, non-naturalism-friendly, way of responding to the explanatory challenge that SUPER gives rise to. This can be seen once we consider what kind of shape the explanatory challenge takes on the assumption that non-cognitivism is true. The key is to realize that the challenge of explaining the necessary relations between the natural and the normative, itself, plausibly takes a different shape depending on how we understand thought about normative matters, and on how we understand thought about what's metaphysically necessary. Given realist non-naturalism, the challenge emerges as difficult to answer; given quasi-realist assumptions, it turns out to be more easily tractable. Or that's what I'll argue for in this section.

In order to see how the explanatory challenge at issue may take different shapes depending on our choice of metanormative theory, we should look into what it is to think that such-and-such is metaphysically necessary. Just as in metaethics, with alethic modalities, too, we may distinguish between representationalist (or cognitivist) and non-representationalist (or non-cognitivist) views:

---

[8] Although I shall not try to press the point in any detail here, I will just note that if quasi-realism has the resources explain the status of SUPER as a conceptual truth, this might be an important point in its favor. It is not clear, after all, that the realist non-naturalist can muster any satisfying explanation here. It is sometimes suggested that this kind of explanation is easily available. Olson (2014, p. 90; see also Dreier 1992, p. 21; Enoch 2011, pp. 148–150) writes that "non-naturalists can appeal to what I claim would be a natural reaction to a speaker who flouts one or both of these theses, namely that such a person has failed to grasp our moral concepts adequately." This may be a good way of arguing *that* SUPER is a conceptual truth, but perhaps one could still sensibly ask for an explanation for *why* this is so. On Olson's (2014, p. 90) view, we realize the truth of SUPER by reflecting on the nature of moral properties "just as when we reflect on the property of being a rectangle we realize that rectangles can have no more and no less than four corners." However, the cases seem importantly different. Whereas rectangles' having four corners flows straightforwardly from the content of our rectangle-beliefs, the truth of SUPER doesn't seem to flow in a similar way from our moral concepts – given that non-naturalism is true, and that our basic normative concepts are unanalyzable. Finally, even if no explanation is needed for the status of SUPER as a conceptual truth, having one might nevertheless be a neat bonus (cf. Shafer-Landau 2005, p. 328).

□_M-Rᴇᴘ   For any proposition, *p*, concerning something being metaphysically necessary, (1) to think that *p* is to represent modal reality as being a certain way, and (2) this – the truth of (1) – doesn't hold just in virtue of the fact that to think that *p* is to be in a certain kind of non-representational state.

□_M-N-ʀ   For any proposition, *p*, concerning something being metaphysically necessary, to think that *p* is to be in a certain non-representational state of mind, and (ii) if it is also to represent modal reality as being a certain way, this is so just in virtue of the truth of (i).

Again, we are only interested, in the present context, in views, according to which there really are facts about what is necessary, and these facts are suitably mind-independent. With these assumptions in place, the representationalist view amounts to *modal realism*. There is no need to consider, in any great detail, the variety of forms that realist views about metaphysical necessity might take. On some such views, claims about metaphysical necessity represent the modal properties of the actual world. We might call such views, with Amie Thomasson (2007, MS), forms of *heavyweight modal realism*. On other modal realist views, modal claims rather represent modal reality as being a certain way by representing the distribution of non-modal features also in non-actual worlds. Thomasson's terms for such views are *possible worlds realism* and *Lewisian realism*.[9] According to modal realist views, thinking that having one property, *F*ness, necessitates having another, *G*ness, is usefully understood as representing *F*ness as having the property of necessitating *G*ness, or as representing *F*ness as being accompanied by *G*ness in all possible worlds. I am admittedly being very sparse on details, here, but the differences between the different realist views shouldn't matter much in what follows (for a detailed discussion of the different varieties of modal realism, see, e.g., Divers 2002).

However, we must give a somewhat closer look at the non-representationalist, or quasi-realist, option. The basic idea behind many of the non-representationalist approaches would be that when someone thinks, for instance, that all bachelors must be males, this is a matter of endorsing a rule for thought (Thomasson 2007, 2009, 2013, MS; cf. Ryle 1950; Sellars 1958; Blackburn 1984: pp. 213–217, 1987; Brandom 2008). On Amie Thomasson's (2007, MS) view, for example, the function of claims about metaphysical necessity is to convey, or to express, constitutive semantic rules while remaining in the object-language. One of the constitutive semantic rules governing the term 'bachelor' may be stated in the imperative mood, in metalanguage, as follows: "Apply 'bachelor' only to things to which 'man' also applies." But we may also convey, or express, this rule in the object-language by saying 'Necessarily, bachelors are men.' Or that's, very roughly, Thomasson's idea. We could then say that, on this view, to think that it is necessary that bachelors are men is, roughly, a matter of endorsing – in virtue of mastering

---

[9] Thomasson isn't claiming that David Lewis's (1986) view would be Lewisian in this sense.

the constitutive meaning rules for 'bachelor' – thinking of something, *x*, as a bachelor just in case *x* is a man. Or perhaps we could say that this would be a matter of having – in virtue of mastering the constitutive meaning rules for the term – a disposition or a "plan" (Gibbard 2012) to think of someone as a bachelor just in case one thinks of this someone as a man. This is a little rough, but perhaps sufficient for our purposes here.[10]

Metaphysical necessities are often *a posteriori*. How would a view along these lines make sense of claims concerning such necessities? When someone claims that, necessarily, water is H_2O, this cannot be a matter of her conveying a constitutive meaning rule governing our use of 'water'. The meaning rules for 'water' don't involve H_2O, after all; one can fully master the rules for the proper use of 'water' without having any idea of the possibility of being composed of H_2O molecules. Thomasson's view captures *a posteriori* necessities as involving schematic and world-deferential constitutive semantic rules, which are then filled in with suitable empirical facts (Thomasson MS, ch. 4). The idea is that when someone accepts that, necessarily, water is H_2O, this is, indeed, a matter of her conveying a rule that says to apply 'water' only to whatever 'H_2O' applies to, but that this rule is derived from a more fundamental rule together with empirical information. The more fundamental rule is a constitutive semantic rule governing 'water', which says to apply 'water' only to whatever has a certain kind of microstructure – roughly, to whatever has the microstructure that the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance has. This rule, together with the *a posteriori* knowable fact that the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance has the H_2O-microstructure, gives us, then, the derived rule that tells to apply 'water' only to H_2O. So, when someone thinks that, necessarily, water is H_2O, this is a matter of her endorsing – in virtue of mastering the semantic rules for 'water' – applying 'water' only to stuff of a certain kind, and of her believing that that stuff is made of H_2O.

Thomasson doesn't discuss normative necessities, but we may consider how a view along the lines that she proposes would handle such cases. Suppose that we wish to know what it is to think the following: that it is metaphysically necessary, that if an action is happiness-maximizing, it is morally right. As with water and H_2O, this is not a matter of endorsing any movement of mind simply in virtue of having mastery of the semantic rules governing the relevant terms. For a non-naturalist, at least, the semantic rules won't be of much help here. They won't link proper applications of 'right' to any particular natural properties – even given further empirical information (as the rules for 'water' perhaps do). But we could extend Thomasson's view to the normative case by saying, for example, that thinking that it is necessary that happiness-maximizing acts are right amounts to endorsing, if the question arises, thinking of any act that one thinks is happiness-maximizing, that it is also right. Perhaps we could also say that here, too, one conveys what follows from the semantic rules governing 'right' with certain further assumptions. It's just that the semantic rule is a trivial one that tells us to apply 'right' to whatever seems

---

[10] Although not part of Thomasson's view, as far as I can see, it seems that we would also need something a little more positive here – something like a disposition or a commitment to move from someone's being a bachelor to his being a man, if the question arises.

right, and the further assumptions (e.g., that happiness-maximizing actions seem right) aren't empirical ones, but rather something given by *a priori* intuition, or by our desire-like attitudes, or standards for rightness.

Another recent non-representationalism-*friendly* account of necessity thought has been articulated by John Divers (in collaboration with other philosophers; see Divers & Elstein 2012, Divers & González-Varela 2013).[11] Divers & co. seek a functional characterization of necessity thought – or of 'box-belief', as he puts it – by offering an account of the "proper" (or paradigmatic) ways of forming box-beliefs, as well as of the proper ways of manifesting them. They do not take a stance on the issue of modal realism vs. quasi-realism, but rather remain neutral on whether having a box-belief just is a matter of playing the relevant functional role, or whether playing this role is instead to be explained with reference to an account of box-belief as representing the modal reality. Nevertheless, their account is intended to be "at least consistent with various anti-realistic theories of modality" (Divers & González-Varela 2013, p. 361, n. 2). Roughly, on this account, someone (properly) believes that some proposition, *p*, is necessary, if and only if she is unable to make anything of the supposition that not-*p*, and if she is, moreover, prepared to appeal to *p* as a premise under any supposition.[12]

A posteriori necessities raise a *prima facie* problem also for this kind of non-representationalist account. I think that it is necessary that water contains hydrogen. However, it still seems that I might be able to make *something* of a supposition that water does not contain hydrogen. Also, I might not be prepared to appeal to the proposition that water contains hydrogen in reasoning under *any* supposition – for instance under the supposition that water actually does not contain hydrogen, or under the supposition that, more generally, modern chemistry is largely mistaken. Divers and González-Varela might then seem to be unable to articulate necessary conditions for my having the relevant box-belief. The solution that Divers and González-Varela offer is to make use of a distinction between two ways in which we may suppose that something is the case. To *A*-suppose that *p* is (roughly) to *suppose-as-actual* that *p*, whereas to *C*-suppose that *p* is (roughly) to *suppose-as-counterfactual* that *p*. These attitudes are quite different. It is one thing to *A*-suppose that Socrates is a robot, that is, to suppose that Socrates actually was a robot. It is a wholly different business to *C*-suppose that Socrates is a robot, that is, to suppose that Socrates had been a robot, even though he in fact wasn't (Divers & González-Varela, pp. 362–266). With this distinction at hand, Divers and González-Varela (2013, pp. 366, 381) propose the following *acquisition and manifestation conditions* for a box-belief that *p*:

---

[11] Thanks to Pekka Väyrynen for pointing me toward Divers & Elstein 2012. There are also other views I should've looked into, I'm sure (e.g., expressivist views on epistemic modals). Should've, but haven't, really.

[12] The idea that a box-belief in some proposition is a matter of being unable to make anything of the contrary proposition is reminiscent of Blackburn's (1986) work, to which Divers and González-Varela give due credit.

ACQ   (i) *X* believes that *p* and (ii) *X* finds herself [able to sustain the *A*-supposition that *p*, but (iii) unable to sustain under that *A*-supposition, the *C*-supposition that not-*p*].

MAN   (i) *X* believes that *p* and (ii) for all *S*, such that *X* finds herself [(iii) able to *A*-suppose *p* and (iv) subsequently to *C*-suppose that *S*] *X* is prepared to add *p* as a premise in reasoning from the *C*-supposition that *S*.[13]

This would seem to take care of the problem with *a posteriori* necessities. Even though I am able to suppose, in a sense, that water doesn't contain any hydrogen (I'm able to suppose that I'm surrounded by watery stuff with no hydrogen in it), I'm not able to believe that it does contain hydrogen, to sustain a supposition that this is so, and, under that supposition, to suppose that it might not have contained any hydrogen. Also, I *am* prepared to add the supposition that water contains hydrogen to reasoning under any counterfactual supposition that I'm able to entertain under the supposition that (as I believe) water actually does contain hydrogen. Although it is true that I am not prepared to add the supposition that water contains hydrogen to reasoning under the supposition that modern chemistry is entirely mistaken, this is, by MAN, wholly irrelevant to my treating water's containing hydrogen as necessary.

On this kind of account, to think (in the paradigmatic, proper, way) that it is necessary that whatever maximizes happiness is also right is to think, in a way spiced up by certain attitudes toward certain suppositions, that happiness-maximizing acts are right. Roughly, it is to think this while being unable to suppose that a happiness-maximizing action might not have been right, and with readiness to appeal to the belief that happiness-maximizing actions are right in reasoning under any counterfactual supposition.

3 – THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE REVISITED (AND ANSWERED)

We are now in a position to consider the prospects of answering our explanatory challenge under the different guises that it might take, depending on how we understand both thought concerning normativity and thought concerning metaphysical necessity. We might, in principle, try combining both realist non-naturalism and quasi-realist non-naturalism in metaethics with either a realist or a quasi-realist account of metaphysical modal judgment.

For a realist non-naturalist in metaethics, it is natural to take a realist, representationalist approach also to metaphysical necessity. The strengths and weaknesses of a representationalist view will be partly similar in both cases. For instance, if the appeal to the idea that a certain class of judgments functions to represent a certain realm of properties and facts helps in providing, say, neat explanation for the ways in which the relevant judgments acquire their meaning, then this advantage is presumably

---

[13] I've changed the mistaken numbering ((i), (ii), (ii), (iii)) in the original.

available both in relation to normative thought and in relation to modal thought. And if there are metaphysical or epistemological costs to positing facts to be represented by our normative or modal claims, similar costs are likely to pertain to both cases. Moreover, there is considerable pressure to give a unified account of alethic modal thought and the paradigmatically normative thought – both dealing in musts, oughts, and mays (see, e.g., Chrisman 2016, Wodak MS).

Let us again suppose that our explanatory challenge is that of explaining why it is metaphysically necessary that hedonically optimal actions are morally right. How should we understand this explanatory challenge, given adoption of a realist view regarding both normative thought and necessity thought? Given this combination of views, to think that it is necessary that hedonically optimal actions are morally right is to represent (having) the property of being hedonically optimal as necessitating (having) the property of being morally right, or to represent all possible worlds as being such that whatever maximizes happiness is also morally right. Our requesting an explanation for why it is that being hedonically optimal necessitates being morally right amounts, then, to our asking:

> CHAL 1   Why does the property of being happiness-maximizing have the property of necessitating having the property of being right?

> CHAL 2   Why is it that, in all worlds, anything that has the property of being happiness-maximizing also has the property of being morally right?

I have already briefly explained, above, why answering this kind of explanatory challenge seems tough for a non-naturalist. Casting the challenge in an explicitly modal realist light offers no help. The relevant questions still seem hard to answer for a realist non-naturalist. An appeal may be made, again, to the idea that the property of being happiness-maximizing is a right-*making* property (see section 1, above). But again, this seems like a mysterious, bad explanation – at least when offered within the realist framework.

Could a quasi-realist non-naturalist adopt a representationalist, realist, account of claims concerning metaphysical necessity? This would seem like a puzzling combination of views. As noted, there's pressure to adopt the same kind of explanation of all thought that deals in musts, oughts, and mays. A quasi-realist might propose that we nevertheless accept a disunified account of necessity thought – that we understand some necessity claims (e.g., the claim that it is necessary that water is H_2O, or claims about what must be the case epistemically or legally speaking) as representational, others (e.g., the claim that it is necessary that what maximizes happiness is morally right) as expressive of our non-representational attitudes. But even if it does make sense to go for this kind of disunity in our account of necessity thought, the quasi-realist non-naturalist should feel agonized about the idea of providing a representational account of the necessity claims such that we are concerned with, in the present context. To think that it is necessary that hedonically optimal acts are morally right clearly amounts to making a

moral judgment of sorts, and a quasi-realist non-naturalist will not be willing to offer a representational account of this kind of judgment.

What if we adopt a non-representational, quasi-realist account of metaphysical modal thought? Would that be helpful for the realist non-naturalist? I do not think so. First, I have already suggested that a realist non-naturalist should stick with a representationalist, or a realist, account of modal thought, too. But let us set that to one side. Let us suppose, first, that something in the neighborhood of Thomasson's account of metaphysical necessity claims is correct. The challenge to explain why it is that happiness-maximizing actions are right would now seem to take something like the following form:

CHAL 3   Why think of any happiness-maximizing action that it is right?

Given this kind of non-representationalist take on judgments about metaphysical necessity, we may, by the realist non-naturalist's lights, understand this challenge as follows:

CHAL 3$_R$ Why represent any action that is happiness-maximizing as being right?

But this seems unhelpful. Assuming that being happiness-maximizing and being morally right are wholly distinct properties, it just isn't clear, at all, why we should restrict our thinking so as to always judge a happiness-maximizing action to be right (if the question arises). One might say that we should so restrict our thinking because being happiness-maximizing makes right, but we have seen that this is not a helpful response for a realist non-naturalist.

How does our explanatory challenge look if we understand box-belief along the lines proposed by Divers & co.? Given this kind of view, our explanatory challenge would seem to take roughly the following sort of shape:

CHAL 4   Why, given that happiness-maximizing actions are right, find oneself
                unable to suppose that they might not have been right? And why rely
                on this being true under any counterfactual supposition?

Again, given a realist reading, we seem to lack answers to these questions. Given that the properties of being happiness-maximizing and being right are completely distinct, why should one's supposings be restricted in the relevant ways? Once again, one might wish to appeal to the idea that being hedonically optimal makes right, but, once again, this is of no help for the realist non-naturalist.

Things start to look importantly different, however, once we take aboard a quasi-realist account of thought concerning what is right, and understand the non-representationalist renditions of our explanatory challenge regarding metaphysical necessity accordingly. Let us suppose, first – implausibly, but for the sake of simplicity – that to think that an action is right just is to plan to perform the action in

question. And let us begin by casting our challenge in a Thomassonian light. Once so cast, our challenge is, again, to answer this:

CHAL 3   Why think of any happiness-maximizing action that it is right?

With our 'pure' non-cognitivist toy version of quasi-realist non-naturalism, this transforms into:

CHAL 3$_{Q-R}$ Why plan to perform actions that maximize happiness?

This is just a practical question concerning how to plan, or how to live. Note that this question is not the same as the question: why is it good to plan to perform actions that maximize happiness? Or: Why see to it that one plans to perform actions that maximize happiness? Rather, this is a question the answer to which also answers the question: Why maximize happiness? This question seems drastically different from the questions that realist non-naturalism gave rise to. We have, in effect, eliminated from our explanatory challenge any reference to the property of being morally right. Or, well, of course the challenge still concerns the property of being right – the question before us still concerns the necessary relation between hedonic optimality and rightness. But the quasi-realist non-naturalist gives us an explanation of what this question amounts to, or a story about what it is to ask this question, in which rightness does not figure. Tough metaphysical questions dissipate; the question about rightness takes the form of a practical question concerning how to live.

Of course, practical questions concerning how to live are tough, too! It's extremely difficult to correctly answer practical questions regarding how to live. But we know what to do with such questions. We know how, in principle, to answer them. Questions of what to do end somewhere. They ultimately receive their answers with some ultimate plans or decisions. In first-order normative theory, too, we plausibly hit a point, somewhere, where we are happy to reject the demand for further explanations or justifications. Why maximize happiness? Well, because that *maximizes happiness*. That's just the thing to do. This may be a problematic answer to the question 'Why maximize happiness?' Some might think that the right answer would be to reject maximizing happiness, or to say that we are to maximize happiness because we are to obey God's commands, or whatever. But this answer – that maximizing happiness maximizes happiness, or just is the thing to do – seems like the sort of answer that a *classical utilitarian* can sensibly offer. Which questions about the necessary connections between the natural and the normative need answering depends on what the correct normative theory is. *If* utilitarianism is correct, then one of the relevant questions is: Why is it necessary that any action that is hedonically optimal is also morally right? Now, if we're assuming that classical utilitarianism is right, then, given quasi-realist non-naturalism (of the brand that we're toying with), this question is a question of why maximize happiness. And given the assumption of classical utilitarianism, it seems perfectly fine to answer this question with 'That's just the thing to do' – or with a plan to maximize happiness. Once we hit the point, in normative theorizing,

where we need no further justifications, we can also rest content regarding the corresponding, seemingly 'metanormative' challenge to explain the necessary connection between wildly discontinuous properties. In a characteristically quasi-realist vein, what first seemed like a puzzling metaethical question now turns out to be, by the quasi-realist's lights, a first-order normative issue. A very difficult issue, perhaps, but one that we know how to deal with, and that raises no metaphysical mysteries.

We might also consider a somewhat (but only somewhat) more complex toy version of quasi-realist non-naturalism, a simple form of a *relational view*, according to which to think that an action is right is to plan to perform actions with *some* (possibly rather complex) natural property, and to represent the action in question as having *that* property (see Schroeder 2013, Toppinen 2013, Ridge 2014). The relevant property may vary from one thinker to another, while the plans and representations remain related in the same way. So, consider two thinkers – call them 'Disgrace' and 'Archgoat'. Disgrace plans to maximize misery and represents a certain action, φ-ing, as hedonically pessimal (as one might put it), while Archgoat plans to maximize heteronomy and represents φ-ing as best conducive to this goal. Disgrace and Archgoat then differently realize the kind of massively multiply realizable relational state that they are both in, and that constitutes thinking that φ-ing would be morally right. On this kind of view, the challenge, when given a Thomassonian form, would be one that a classical utilitarian should answer by answering a question along the following lines:

CHAL 3$_{Q-R^*}$ (I shall perform happiness-maximizing actions! +) Why represent happiness-maximizing actions as being happiness-maximizing?

The conative element of the question ('I shall perform happiness-maximizing actions!') is, of course, crucial here. On this kind of view, asking why it is necessary that happiness-maximizing actions are right is not simply to ask: why is it necessary that happiness-maximizing actions are happiness-maximizing. However, for a classical utilitarian, the first question is answered by answering the second. Just as with the first toy quasi-realist account, any problematic reference to the property of rightness dissipates here. For a classical utilitarian, a proper way of answering to the question 'Why is there a necessary connection between being happiness-maximizing and being morally right?' is to say 'Because happiness-maximizing actions are what they are.'

The quasi-realist may now also in a position to take aboard the idea that the necessary connection between being hedonically optimal and being morally right is to be given by appealing to the (presumed) fact that being hedonically optimal *makes* morally right. According to both of our toy quasi-realist views, pure and relational, to think that being hedonically optimal makes morally right is, plausibly, to be disposed to plan to perform hedonically optimal actions on the grounds that they are hedonically optimal. Given that someone's fundamental standards are classically utilitarian, she is relevantly disposed, and so she thinks that an action's being hedonically optimal makes the action morally right. If so, she is of course also committed to planning to do whatever particular actions she thinks are hedonically optimal – that is,

she is, according to our first, purely non-cognitivist, toy theory, committed to thinking that, necessarily, whatever is hedonically optimal is also morally right. However, importantly, even if someone is committed to planning to do whatever has some naturalistic property, she might not be committed to do so on the grounds that the actions in question have that naturalistic property. For example, a classical utilitarian might plan to do whatever is recommended by God, but not on the grounds that the relevant actions are recommended by God. She might plan to do whatever is recommended by God on the basis of her belief that God's recommendations are a perfect guide to maximizing happiness, and on the basis of her plan to do whatever maximizes happiness. According to our first toy version of quasi-realism, we could then explain a necessary connection between a natural property, G, and a normative property, F, with reference to something's being made F by its being G. But we wouldn't need to say that whenever there's a necessary connection between a natural property, G, and a normative property, F, this is so because being G makes F. This is as it should be. Also, in saying this, the quasi-realist wouldn't have appealed to anything mysterious. Rather, by giving a non-cognitivist account of what it is to think that being G makes F, she would have completely demystified this relation, it seems. This is, of course, in a striking contrast to the realist non-naturalists' unhelpful appeals to the making-relation (see section 1, above).

I find it tricky to try to articulate a candidate for a Diversian way of understanding our explanatory challenge in terms of the pure non-cognitivist toy theory. The Diversian account makes heavy use of the attitude of supposition, and it is not at all obvious how a defender of pure non-cognitivism should understand the attitude of supposing that an action is right. This problem is an instance of a more general problem concerning how to account, within a non-cognitivist framework, for various types of non-belief attitudes with normative content (see Schroeder 2010: ch. 5.1). It is not obvious, at all, how the pure non-cognitivist should endeavor to make sense of, for instance, wondering whether an action is right, or of hoping that it would be. Simon Blackburn (1998, p. 70) suggests that we could understand wondering whether an action is right in terms of wondering what to do. Similarly, we might say: to suppose that an action might not have been right is to suppose that the action might not have been the one to perform. If this is fine, we could then take the explanatory challenge, when understood in the Diversian way, to be that of answering something like this:

> CHAL 4$_{Q-R}$ Why, given that happiness-maximizing actions are to be performed, find oneself unable to suppose that they might not have been such as to be performed? And why rely on happiness-maximizing actions being such as to be performed under any counterfactual supposition?

But this doesn't seem very helpful. We might now, just as well, identify believing that happiness-maximizing actions are right with believing that they are such as to be performed, and it's not clear that this affords us much illumination, really, regarding the nature of a belief concerning what's right. We have

replaced the property of being morally right with the property of being such as to be performed. If the former property and its connections to the natural look problematic in certain ways, then presumably this is so also when it comes to the latter property.

For a relational view, making sense of supposing that things are so-and-so, normatively speaking, seems a little bit easier, as we may simply say that to suppose that so-and-so is right is to plan to perform actions with a certain property, and to suppose that so-and-so is the relevant way, or, that is, that so-and-so has that property (Ridge 2014). For the relationalist, the challenge, when understood along the Diversian lines, would be to answer this:

> CHAL 4$_{Q-R*}$ (I shall perform happiness-maximizing actions! +) Why, given that happiness-maximizing actions are happiness-maximizing, find oneself unable to suppose that happiness-maximizing actions might not have been happiness-maximizing? And why rely on this (the fact that happiness-maximizing actions are happiness-maximizing) being true under any counterfactual supposition?

These questions don't seem so hard to answer. We cannot conceive of a scenario where what maximizes happiness fails to maximize happiness. And that happiness-maximizing actions are happiness-maximizing is something we can safely rely on under any counterfactual assumption. This is so because happiness-maximizing actions are what they are. Given the truth of our toy relational view, accepting that happiness-maximizing actions are what they are, plus having the classical utilitarian plans, amounts to accepting that being happiness-maximizing makes morally right, and also answers the question 'Why is it necessary that whatever action maximizes happiness is also morally right?' This would be a nice result – and one that would again be achieved while steering clear of metaphysical mystery.

4 – OUGHTS AND CANS

The explanatory challenge for non-naturalism, at issue here, isn't just about supervenience. Other sorts of claims concerning necessary relations between the natural and the normative also raise interesting explanatory challenges. To take one (somewhat contentious) example, it seems to be metaphysically necessary, that any fact, *p*, that is a reason to believe that *q*, makes it more likely, or provides evidence, that *q*. This, it has been argued (see Smith 2015, forthcoming), means trouble for reasons primitivists (e.g., Parfit 2011, Scanlon 2014), according to whom reasonhood is basic and unanalyzable, and provides support for the idea that there is a reductive analysis to be had – given somehow in terms of making likelier, or in terms of providing evidence – of what it is to be a reason for belief. However, I set the case

of reasons for belief and reasons primitivism aside here, and very sketchily and tentatively explore another example.[14] This (also somewhat contentious) example is given by the principle 'ought implies can':

> OIC   It is metaphysically necessary that if someone ought to perform a certain action, she is able to do so.

Why is OIC true? Some realist non-naturalists have an easy answer: perhaps, for an action, φ, to be such that someone, S, ought to perform it, just is for φ to be the *best* action that S is able to perform. But suppose that we wanted to adopt an ought-primitivist view, according to which oughts are basic and unanalyzable *sui generis* relations. Supposing that this kind of view were true, it would seem unclear what could possibly explain the fact that oughts necessarily attach only to actions such that the relevant agents (those supposedly governed by the oughts) are able to perform.

One might be tempted to think that the necessity in OIC is very easily explained by anyone: it is conceptually necessary that someone ought to perform a certain action only if she is able to do so, and anything that is conceptually necessary is also metaphysically necessary; the truth of OIC is simply explained by our concept of ought.[15] However, this doesn't seem satisfying to me. Let us consider the distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* necessities, as it has been applied, for instance, to the debate on *motivational internalism* (see Tresan 2006) – this being roughly the thesis that there is a necessary connection between normative judgment and motivation. We may distinguish between two kinds of motivational internalist theses:

> DE DICTO   Necessarily, a judgment that one ought to φ is accompanied by at least some motivation to φ.[16]

> DE RE   A judgment that one ought to φ is necessarily accompanied by at least some motivation to φ.

Motivational power might be built into the very nature of a judgment that one ought to φ. If that's correct, then DE RE is true. But DE DICTO might be true even if DE RE isn't. Or that's what someone might think. For one might think that even though it is not in the nature of an ought-judgment that it

---

[14] I focus on Smith's argument against reasons primitivism elsewhere, drawing unsurprising morals: Smith raises an important challenge, which can be answered by reasons primitivists, but perhaps only if they adopt a suitable, non-representational account of reasons thought and talk, which allows them to answer the challenge via a story about what it is to think that such-and-such is a reason to believe so-and-so (Toppinen MS b).

[15] I thank Krister Bykvist for patiently pressing this line of response.

[16] These are very strong internalist claims, which may need to be qualified in certain ways in order to become plausible. For discussion of internalism, see, e.g., the papers in Björnsson et al. (eds.) 2015.

motivates, nothing *counts as* an ought-judgment unless it's accompanied by motivation. A possibly helpful comparison is to the claim that it's necessary that planets orbit stars: nothing counts as a planet unless it orbits a star (let's suppose), but that doesn't mean that it is in the very essence of a planet, itself, that it orbits one. Let's suppose, then, that DE RE is true. And let's suppose, moreover, that DE DICTO is a conceptual truth. As DE DICTO is a conceptual truth, it is also metaphysically necessary that a judgment that one ought to φ is accompanied by at least some motivation to φ. This metaphysical necessity requires no further explanation – it just flows from our concept of an ought-judgment. However, this still leaves the necessity in DE RE unexplained. Of course, we might also think that DE RE is a conceptual truth. But, then, something about the concept of an ought-judgment would have to explain why ought-judgments necessarily are accompanied by motivation. Perhaps the concept of an ought-judgment just is the concept of a plan of sorts, and perhaps it is part of the concept of a plan that plans motivate. But if we're given no account of the concept of an ought-judgment that would explain the *de re* necessity – if we, for instance, simply say that ought-judgments are judgments about the unanalyzable, *sui generis*, ought relation – we don't have an explanation for DE RE.

Likewise, then, for oughts and actions that we are able to perform – *options*, for short. OIC isn't plausibly just a *de dicto* necessity claim. It's not just that a relation only counts as an ought-relation, if it attaches to an option. Rather, it seems plausible that oughts necessarily attach to options, only. That is, it seems plausible that it is in the nature of oughts themselves that they only attach to actions that we are in a position to perform. If that's right, then OIC cannot be explained simply with reference to the *de dicto* conceptual necessity. Just as with internalism, one could, of course, hold a view on which oughts are analyzable. For instance, one could hold something like the view that for an action to be such that one ought to perform it, is for this action to be the one that has the best consequences among the agent's options, or among the actions that the agent is able to perform. If that were correct, then, of course, it would flow from the nature of oughts themselves that they only attach to options. But for an ought-primitivist this line of response to our present explanatory challenge is not an option. And so it seems to me that an ought-primitivist cannot simply shrug off the demand for an explanation for the metaphysical necessity in OIC by saying that it's simply conceptually necessary that oughts only attach to what we're able to do. For an explanation of OIC, understood as a *de re* necessity claim, we'd need a corresponding conceptual necessity, and that's not something that a primitivist about the relevant concepts is in a position to account for.[17]

Going quasi might be of some help for the ought-primitivist, too. Quasi-realism allows for the combination of adopting a primitivist view of oughts, and yet having something substantial to say about ought thought, where what is said about ought thought might provide the primitivist with some

---

[17] If the train of thought in the couple of previous paragraphs is on the right track, it might be of interest in relation to many requests for explaining conceptual necessities in philosophy, e.g., with regard to the demand that the conceptual necessity of SUPER be explained (see n. 8, above). I may pursue this idea further elsewhere.

significant additional explanatory resources. Let's consider the following, Gibbardian, toy theory (see Gibbard 2003):

OUGHT   To think that S ought to φ just is, roughly, to plan to φ, if in S's shoes.

And let us suppose that the following is true (see, e.g., Wallace 2001, Setiya 2007):

PLAN   To plan to φ just is, in part, a matter of believing that one will φ, or of believing that one is able to φ.

These claims are, of course, very controversial. It is worth repeating that my aim, here, is not to establish the right explanation for a certain fact. The assumptions that I'm making are highly questionable, as is the *explanandum* (that is: OIC) itself. Nevertheless, the discussion in this section does further illustrate the way in which the combination of quasi-realism about both normativity and metaphysical modality may help non-naturalists to answer explanatory challenges that have to do with explaining necessary links between the normative and the natural. For suppose, now, that we adopt, again, something like Thomasson's account of metaphysical necessity thought. The challenge to explain OIC is then to answer this:

CHAL 5   Why think that S ought to φ in C, just in case S would be able to φ in C?

It seems permissible for us to make a small change, in order to get:

CHAL 5*   Why think that S ought to φ in C, just in case one would be able to φ, if in S's shoes?[18]

Let's add OUGHT to the picture, and so replace ought thought with planning:

CHAL 5*$_{Q-R}$ Why plan to φ, if in S's shoes, just in case one would be able to φ, if in S's shoes?

Finally, we adopt PLAN, and this gives us:

CHAL 5*$_{Q-R*}$ Why plan to φ, if in S's shoes – that is, in part: why believe that one will φ, or that one would be able to φ, if in S's shoes – just in case one would be able to φ, if in S's shoes?

---

[18] To be in S's shoes is to be in the (epistemically possible) circumstances of being S in C (see Gibbard 2003, ch. 3).

This final question answers itself. Given the Gibbardian assumption about the nature of ought thought, and the suitable non-representationalist understanding of what's at issue when we demand an explanation for a metaphysical necessity, we see why we are committed to thinking that OIC is true. Perhaps this doesn't really explain OIC itself, or why oughts necessarily only attach to actions that we are able to perform. They just do. But once we understand why we are committed to accepting OIC, we see why there's nothing further to be explained here. We could perhaps say that we've thereby found a second-order explanation for why the relevant metaphysical necessity requires no explanation (cf. Dreier 2015).

5 – ALRIGHT, THAT'S ABOUT IT

I've argued that once we take a look at the supervenience challenge through properly quasi-realist lenses, the challenge is likely to emerge as tractable. The quasi-realist in metanormative theory should go for a non-representationalist, quasi-realist account of metaphysical necessity, too, and with this kind of package, the relevant explanatory challenge takes shape as a first-order normative challenge, and so doesn't give rise to any metaphysical mysteries. Or that seems likely, considering the sample of non-representationalist theories about metaphysical necessity thought that I've considered, above (section 2). If that's right, the quasi-realist non-naturalist is not in the same boat with the realist non-naturalist, after all. This would be a weighty reason for someone with non-naturalist sympathies to adopt a quasi-realist position. I've also suggested – through the example of OIC and ought-primitivism – that this kind of quasi-realist package, encompassing also metaphysical modality, might shed light on other issues, too, such that have to do with necessary links between the normative and the natural. There would seem to be many issues that might turn out to be interesting, in this context. Suppose that having a reason to do something requires being able to act accordingly. Why should this be so? Suppose that moral rightness necessarily attaches to actions, exclusively. Why should this be? Why is it that reasons for belief necessarily have to do with evidential considerations? And so on. Many such questions should seem puzzling, given certain non-naturalist (and suitably primitivist) views. Some quasi-realist packages will perhaps be helpful in answering such questions, others perhaps won't. If such questions require answers, this might provide important support for quasi-realism over its competitors, as well as for certain forms of quasi-realism over others. But all this (or most of this, anyway) is work for another day. Here my main aim has been to illustrate how this kind of work might be worth someone's while.

REFERENCES

Björnsson, G. et al. (eds.), 2015. *Motivational Internalism* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Blackburn, S., 1971. "Moral Realism," in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Blackburn, S., 1984. *Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blackburn, S., 1985. "Supervenience Revisited," in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Blackburn, S., 1987. "Morals and Modals," in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Blackburn, S., 1998. *Ruling Passions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brandom, R., 2008. *Between Saying and Doing: Towards and Analytic Pragmatism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chrisman, M., 2016. *The Meaning of 'Ought': Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Divers, J., 2002. *Possible Worlds*. London: Routledge.

Divers, J. & Elstein, D. Y., 2012. "Manifesting Belief in Absolute Necessity," *Philosophical Studies* 158: 109–130.

Divers, J. & Gonzáles-Varela, J. E., 2013. "Belief in Absolute Necessity," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 87: 358–391.

Dreier, J., 1992. "The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 30: 13–38.

Dreier, J., 2004. "Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism," *Philosophical Perspectives* 18: 23–44.

Dreier, J., 2015. "Explaining the Quasi-Real," in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 10*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dreier, J., MS. "Is There a Supervenience Problem for Robust Moral Realism?"

Enoch, D., 2011. *Taking Morality Seriously* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Gibbard, A., 2003. *Thinking How to Live*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Horgan, T., 1993. "From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World," *Mind* 102: 555–586.

Klagge, J., 1988. "Supervenience: Ontological and Ascriptive," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 66: 461–470.

Leary, S., forthcoming. "Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities," in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 12*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D., 1986. *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

McPherson, T., 2012. "Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience," in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 7*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, A., MS, "Moral Superveniene: A Defence of Blackburn's Argument."

Olson, J., 2014. *Moral Error Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Olson, J., 2016. "On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory: Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen," *Journal of Moral Philosophy*: 461–473.

Parfit, D., 2011. *On What Matters, Vol. 2*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ridge, M., 2007. "Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience," *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 4: 330–348.

Ridge, M., 2014. *Impassioned Belief*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosen, G., MS. "What is Normative Necessity?"

Ryle, G., 1950. "'If', 'So', and 'Because'," in *Collected Papers, Vol. 2*. Bristol: Thoemmes, 1971.

Scanlon, T. M., 2014. *Being Realistic about Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schroeder, M., 2007. *Slaves of the Passions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schroeder, M., 2010. *Noncognitivism in Ethics*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Schroeder, M., 2013. "Tempered Expressivism," in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schroeder, M., 2014. "The Price of Supervenience," in *Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sellars, W., 1958. "Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities," in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Setiya, K., 2007. "Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," *Ethics* 117: 649–673.

Shafer-Landau, R., 2003. *Moral Realism: A Defence.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shafer-Landau, R., 2005. "Replies to Critics," *Philosophical Studies* 126: 313–329.

Smith, M., 2000. "Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural," reprinted in *Ethics and the A Priori*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Stratton-Lake, P. & Hooker, B., 2006. "Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness," in T. Horgan & M. Timmons (eds.), *Metaethics after Moore*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sturgeon, N., 2009. "Doubts about the Supervenience of the Evaluative," in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 4*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thomasson, A., 2007. "Modal Expressivism and the Methods of Metaphysics," *Philosophical Topics* 35: 135–160.

Thomasson, A., 2009. "Non-descriptivism about Modality: A Brief History and Revival," *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* 4: 1–26.

Thomasson, A., 2013. "The Nancy D. Simco Lecture: Norms and Necessity," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 51: 143–160.

Thomasson, A., MS. *Norms and Necessity.*

Toppinen, T., 2013. "Believing in Expressivism," in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Toppinen, T., 2016. "Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?" *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 13: 338–361.

Toppinen, T., MS a. "Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience."

Toppinen, T., MS b. "Epistemic Expressivism and Reasons Primitivism."

Tresan, J., 2006. "De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism," *Nôus* 40: 143–165.

Väyrynen, P., 2013. *The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Väyrynen, P., forthcoming. "The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism," in D. Plunkett & T. McPherson (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics*. Routledge.

Wallace, R. J., 2001. "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," reprinted in Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Wodak, D., MS. "Expressivism and Varieties of Normativity."

Zangwill, N., 1995. "Moral Supervenience," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 20: 240–262.